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Introduction
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion
were... some purely personal avocation that can be indulged
entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one's
room.
1
One person's desire to involve others in her religious observance
often collides with another's desire to be left alone. The United States
has tried to accommodate both desires by drawing a boundary line
between acceptable and unacceptable government activity in the reli-
gious sphere. The result has been confusing and inconsistent jurispru-
dence. Under the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 state action violates
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if it fails to meet
three requirements: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
1. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not fos-
ter 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' 3
Although the Supreme Court has not overturned Lemon,4 many
commentators and justices have expressed dissatisfaction with the
test.5 Much attention has focused on the test proposed by Justice
O'Connor in her Lynch v. Donnelly6 concurrence suggesting that the
Establishment Clause prohibits government action that "endorses"
religion. The endorsement test, proposed as a clarification of the
Lemon test 7 has received some scholarly praise.8 It has, however,
also received a great deal of criticism?-most purporting to be "fatal."
3. Id at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1971)).
4. The Supreme Court has usually applied the Lemon test, but has noted its reluc-
tance "to be confined to any single test or criterion." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679
(1984). In at least two cases, the Court did not apply the Lemon test. Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In its
most recent term, the Supreme Court declined an invitation to reconsider Lemon. See
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-
An Update, 75 CAL. L. Rnv. 5,7-8 (1987) [hereinafter Choper, Update] (calling this area of
the law a "conceptual disaster area"); William P. Marshall,'We Know It When We See It'.
The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 497 (1986) (noting that
even the Court has acknowledged the inconsistencies in its jurisprudence).
6. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For similar tests proposed by
commentators, see DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTrrrUTIOfAL ISSUES:
MAKING SENSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE (1991) (arguing that establishment is a
"religiously non-preferential endorsement," a benefit available to all religions but not
available to non-religious activities); Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Estab-
lishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.i. 692, 693 (1968) ("[Ihe [establishment] clause should
be read to prohibit only aid which has as its motive or substantial effect the imposition of
religious belief or practice."); id. at 727 ("A no-imposition standard makes it unnecessary
to decide whether particular state action constitutes coercion. Compelling religious partici-
pation is certainly an imposition, but so is persuasion, endorsement or any other means of
influencing choice.").
7. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. For a discussion of whether O'Connor's test is indeed a
clarification of Lemon, see infra part II.B.
8. See Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Reli-
gion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 53, 54-
55 (1990); Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as Libera" The Religion Clauses, Liberal
Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 151, 180
(1987) (arguing for governmental "liberal neutrality," under which courts should "inquire
whether the statute or government belief in question is intended to cause people to adhere
to a particular set of beliefs, or is likely to do so"). As Beschle's analysis demonstrates, this
Article's suggestion that government should not influence religious choices is not new.
Nonetheless, previous scholarship and O'Connor's articulation of the test have been reluc-
tant to take endorsement or influence to their logical conclusions, as this Article does.
9. See, e.g., Theodore C. Hirt, 'Symbolic Union' of Church and State and the 'En-
dorsement' of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 823 (1989); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Percep-
tions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86
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Commentators have listed problems with the test as currently formu-
lated, and suggested that these problems mandate rejection of the test.
Some of the criticism, particularly the argument that the test is too
vague as currently formulated, is valid. This Article argues that a re-
fined endorsement test is the proper approach for interpreting the Es-
tablishment Clause. The problems with O'Connor's endorsement test
are remediable. A more precise definition of "endorsement" will en-
able the "unwieldy" test10 to have practical application. The endorse-
ment test is the only test currently supported by a Supreme Court
Justice that gives adequate protection to the values the Establishment
Clause must protect.
Part I of this Article contrasts the endorsement test, as it has been
applied thus far, with the most prominent alternative, the coercion
test. Part II surveys the problems with Justice O'Connor's formula-
tion of the endorsement test. Part III proposes a new understanding
of endorsement, based on "adoptive action," and applies it to a variety
of contexts. Part IV proposes a model of government-citizen interac-
tion based on government influence of individual religious decisions in
order to identify the values that an Establishment Clause test must
protect. Part V uses that model to argue that the endorsement test
best represents the values embraced in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
I. Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test and the
Coercion Test
A. Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test
According to Justice O'Connor, government can violate the Es-
tablishment Clause in two ways."' First, government can become ex-
cessively entangled with religious institutions.'2 The "second and
more direct infringement" occurs when state action communicates or
is intended to communicate endorsement of religion.' 3 Endorsement,
MicH. L. REv. 266, 292 (1987); Mark Thshnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 701, 701-02 (1986).
10. See Hirt, supra note 9.
11. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. This Article does not propose inclusion of entanglement in the Establishment
Clause test because it is not necessary to protect the values underlying the Establishment
Clause. For a critique of the use of entanglement in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
see Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Con-
flict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 681-85 (1980).
13. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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while partly a question of historical fact, is largely "a legal question to
be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts."' 4
In Lynch, Justice O'Connor suggested that endorsement should
be measured by the actual perceptions of real people:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the
intention of the speaker and on the 'objective' meaning of the
statement in the community .... If the audience is large, as it
always is when the government 'speaks' by word or deed, some
portion of the audience will inevitably receive a message deter-
mined by the 'objective' content of the statement, and some por-
tion will inevitably receive the intended message.'
5
O'Connor's discussion of the facts of Lynch, however, did not
provide any indication of how the standard was to be applied. 6 The
Lynch Court considered the constitutionality of a city's Christmas na-
tivity display. 7 The display was located in a park in the center of the
city's shopping district.' The park was owned by a nonprofit organi-
zation. O'Connor's analysis of the facts began: "Pawtucket's display
of its creche, I believe, does not communicate a message that the gov-
ernment intends to endorse the Christian beliefs represented by the
creche."'19
It is not clear whether O'Connor believed her own perceptions of
endorsement were dispositive, or whether she intended the statement
as a mere rhetorical device. Regardless, the criteria she used in form-
ing her belief were not specifically stated. O'Connor went on to note
that "no one contends" the creche endorsed religion,20 leaving unclear
how claims would have been evaluated.
In later cases, O'Connor used "a purely fictitious character"'" to
measure endorsement. In her concurrence in Wallace v. Jaffree,22 she
explained that "[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer,
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement" of religion.
23
14. Id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 670-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 671 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21. Smith, supra note 9, at 292.
22. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 76, (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Wallace invalidated an Alabama statute that set aside a one-min-
ute moment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer" 24 in public
schools. O'Connor found that a mandatory moment of silence was
not necessarily an endorsement of prayer,' but that Alabama's stat-
ute did not pass constitutional muster. O'Connor noted that the legis-
lative history of the statute strongly suggested it was intended to
endorse prayer.26 Prior to enacting the statute at issue in Wallace, Al-
abama law provided for a moment of silence.27 The only difference
between the two laws was that the earlier statute did not list voluntary
prayer as one of the activities for which the moment was designated.
The legislative history indicated that the sole purpose of the new stat-
ute was "to return voluntary prayer to our public schools.
28
O'Connor concluded that an objective observer would view this evi-
dence and conclude that the state had intended to endorse religion.29
Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor failed to explain how an objective
observer differed from a judge, or what constituted endorsement in
general.
A majority of the Court embraced the endorsement test in Alle-
gheny v. ACLU.3° In Allegheny, the Court found the display of a
creche in a courthouse an endorsement, but held that a public display
of a Jewish Chanukah menorah next to a Christmas tree did not con-
stitute endorsement. The Court found several factors relevant. First,
it explained the religious and cultural meanings of the various reli-
gious symbols. The Court noted that the creche display included a
written message that was clearly religious: "Glory to God in the High-
est!"31 The opinion pointed out that nothing in the setting of the
creche detracted from its religious content.32 The Court stated: "Gov-
ernment may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but
under the First Amendment it may not observe it as a Christian holy
day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus....
Government may celebrate Christmas in some manner and form, but
not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine."33
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
31. Id. at 598.
32. Id. at 598-99. The Court distinguished Lynch by observing that the Lynch cr6che
contained various "secular" Christmas symbols, such as Santa Claus and his reindeer.
33. Id. at 601.
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The Court also spoke of "the bedrock Establishment Clause prin-
ciple that, regardless of history, government may not demonstrate a
preference for a particular faith."34 The Court did not, however, artic-
ulate a standard to measure endorsement.3 5 There was no majority
opinion on the question of why the Christmas tree and Menorah were
permissible.
B. Endorsement as a Clarification of Lemon
When O'Connor first proposed the endorsement test, she claimed
to be merely suggesting a clarification of Lemon. 6 Yet, if it were a
clarification, it would simply be a more detailed explanation of the
Lemon test and not alter the basic direction of Lemon's inquiry. In-
stead, the endorsement test replaces the foci of the Lemon test with
foci of its own, thereby altering the test considerably; how state action
affects religion is no longer important. Rather, the endorsement test
focuses on how people perceive the relationship between the state and
religion. The endorsement and Lemon tests are different approaches
that often yield divergent results. 7
If, for example, the state action benefits religion, the two tests ask
different questions. The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether
the "principal or primary effect [is] one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion."38 This prong commands an evaluation of the various
effects relative to each other, asking whether the secular effect is "pri-
mary." If it is, then the benefit conferred upon religion, including any
benefit to religion vis-a-vis other religions, is constitutionally permissi-
ble. In theory, any benefit to religion is legitimate so long as that ben-
efit is not the primary one.39 The endorsement test ignores the effect
34. Id. at 603.
35. Four other members of the Court joined the portions of Justice Blackmun's opin-
ion quoted above. Writing only for himself, he suggested that endorsement is measured by
the perceptions of adherents to the religion claimed to be endorsed, the perceptions of
nonadherents, and the perceptions of a reasonable observer. Id. at 620.
36. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. See Robert A. Holland, A Theory of Establishment Clause Adjudication: Individu-
alism, Social Contract, and the Significance of Coercion in Identifying Threats to Religious
Liberty, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1595, 1659 (1992).
38. Lemon, 430 U.S. at 612-13.
39. There have been several approaches to the meaning of "primary." One is to refer
to the most significant effect as "primary" and to other effects as "secondary." The Court
took this approach in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396-98 (1983). In Mueller, the Court
sustained a Minnesota tax deduction for certain educational expenses which principally
benefitted parents with children at parochial schools. The Court found that although there
was a benefit to religion, the benefit from the group of available tax deductions was far
broader.
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and asks only whether the act signifies a symbolic union of church and
state.
Suppose that the President of the United States gave a speech
which encouraged Americans to become more religious and that his
motivation was to fulfill a promise to his brother. Further, suppose
that social scientists subsequently demonstrated that no one followed
the President's advice and that many people reacted by losing respect
for the President. The Lemon test requires the presence of a secular
purpose. Therefore, the first prong of Lemon would be satisfied be-
cause the president had a secular purpose. The effect on the public's
opinion of the president would be the primary effect, the action would
therefore pass the second prong of the Lemon test.40 The third prong
of the Lemon test-entanglement-would similarly pose no problem
because there is no intertwining of administrative machinery.
It would, however, be an endorsement. Most likely, a court
would find that the president intended to endorse religion. Therefore,
the purpose prong of the endorsement test would not be satisfied.
Similarly, the speech would constitute an endorsement, failing
O'Connor's effects prong. The entanglement prong, however, would
be satisfied because there would be no intertwining of administrative
machinery. Thus, the action would fail two of O'Connor's prongs, but
no prong of Lemon.
O'Connor attempts to harmonize the two tests: "Focusing on the
evil of government endorsement or disapproval of religion makes
clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted
not to require invalidation of a government practice merely because it
in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of
religion."'" This statement contradicts the plain meaning of the sec-
Another interpretation of the effects prong is to use "primary" to refer to the effect
most closely connected to the action and call "derivative" those effects dependent on the
primary one. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools,
56 CAL. L. REv. 260, 277-83, 309 (1968).
Still another method that the Court has used in applying the second prong of the
Lemon test is to consider the magnitude of the benefit to religion in an absolute sense. In
Lynch, the creche display passed the second prong because it was less beneficial to religion
than other programs previously sanctioned. For example, the expenditure of taxpayer
funds for textbooks for parochial schools was approved in Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968). See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681-82 (1984).
40. While this illustration depends in part on one's definition of "advance," one test is
relative and the other is absolute. Moreover, the secular purpose and effect is in no way
"derivative." There is no need for the religious goal-greater spirituality on the part of
Americans-to occur in order for the carrying out of the promise or the backlash to
happen.
41. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ond prong of the Lemon test, which mandates that "the principal or
primary effect" of a law "must be one that neither advances or inhibits
religion." 42
C. The Coercion Test
The other test that may replace the Lemon test is the coercion
test. Given that the value of any test is dependent in large part on
what the alternatives are, it is important to consider coercion, a test
that currently enjoys considerable support.4 3
Consideration of the coercion test is complicated as there is not
one coercion test, but many, united under one banner. It is, however,
possible to classify the varying coercion tests based on their treatment
of two variables: (1) What behavior the government promotes, and
(2) what tools the government uses to promote the behavior.
Proponents of the coercion test disagree about whether the activ-
ity the government promotes must be active in order for coercion to
exist, or whether a passive activity can be coercive. Passive activities
only require presence at a religious event. Additional activity beyond
mere presence is active.44 In other words, the question is whether co-
erced attendance at a religious function violates the Constitution, or
whether only coercion of participation-defined as something more
than physical presence-is unconstitutional.
The distinction between these two coercion tests is evident from
the majority and dissenting opinions in Lee v. Weisman.45 In Lee, the
Court held a religious invocation at a middle school graduation un-
constitutional. The Lee Court divided over whether the graduation
invocation was coercive. The minority espoused the position that the
action could not be coercive if the state action caused only passive
participation.46 Deborah Weisman was forced to stand silently during
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
43. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgement in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy's approach may now command
a majority of the Court. See Constitutional Law Conference, 61 U.S.L.W. 2237,2240 (Octo-
ber 27,1992) (Professor Choper arguing that the Lee v. Weisman opinions reveal that there
are now five votes for a coercion test). For a specific discussion of the ambiguities in the
Kennedy coercion test, see Holland, supra note 37, at 1672. Several academics also sup-
port the coercion test. See, e.g., JussE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRIN-
CIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUsES, 34 n.135 (1995)
(supporting a similar test); Holland, supra note 37; Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: the
Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933, 941 (1986).
44. E.g. saying a prayer aloud or gesturing in a particular way, is active.
45. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
46. Even though both the majority and minority spent considerable effort arguing
whether the ceremony was coercive, neither advocated making coercion the exclusive Es-
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her graduation ceremony while a rabbi prayed out loud, and (presum-
ably) other people prayed silently. According to the majority, this was
forced participation in religion.47 The exercise was not voluntary, be-
cause graduation is an important event in people's lives that few
would ordinarily choose to miss.48 The religious phase of the gradua-
tion ceremony was not voluntary, because children had to choose be-
tween silently standing and subjecting themselves to the attention and
embarrassment that would have accompanied leaving, sitting or
speaking at the ceremony.
Justice Scalia and three other dissenters took issue with the con-
clusion that this was "participation in religion." The dissent believed
that standing silently at such a ceremony was not itself "religious," but
a sign of respect for others.49
The other variable attending a coercion test is what tools the gov-
ernment is prohibited from employing, that is, what "coercion"
means. No coercion-test advocate has taken the position that coer-
cion is limited to express criminal prohibitions. Justice Kennedy has
stated, for example, that erection of a large Roman Cross atop city
hall would have a coercive effect, even though it would not rise to the
level of official government sanction.5 °
HI. Problems with O'Connor's Formulation of Endorsement
The Endorsement Test is the correct test to apply the Establish-
ment Clause. The criteria for application of this test, however, are too
vague.
A. Problems with Focusing on Real People
As noted earlier, O'Connor's initial formulation in Lynch of the
endorsement test focused on "the 'objective' meaning of [purported
tablishment Clause test. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (majority refused to reconsider Lemon, but
noted that the Court had always held religiously coercive laws unconstitutional); id. at 2685
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting both the Court's particular application of coercion analy-
sis and its use of a "psycho-coercion" approach, "which suffers the double disability of
having no roots whatever in our people's historic practice, and being as infinitely expand-
able as the reasons for psychotherapy itself").
47. Id. at 2658 ("There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at
the graduation, the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in
the Rabbi's prayer.").
48. Id. at 2659.
49. Id. at 2683 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
50. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661, (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgement in part and
dissenting in part).
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religious activity] in the community."' 51 She gave no clue about how
one should cull one "objective" meaning from an act or message. Nor
was she necessarily correct in assuming that there is one "objective"
interpretation.
O'Connor's application of the endorsement test suggests the test
is less empirical than one might think from the plain words of her
description in Lynch. In Lynch, O'Connor made no reference to the
testimony of community members. If the test should not be applied
empirically, it is unclear how to determine the "objective" meaning.
If, however, the formulation is a suggestion that courts decide en-
dorsement issues based on the testimony of members of the commu-
nity,52 the test is doomed. 3 Government would be paralyzed if the
perception of any one person (i.e. the plaintiff in a particular case)
were enough to block government action.5 4 On the other hand, re-
quiring a majority to perceive endorsement in a government action
would fail to protect religious minorities.55 Moreover, courts would
encounter substantial difficulties in determining whether perceptions
of endorsement were genuine.
Although this approach would have the virtue of at least some
degree of attention to the reactions of real people, it is hardly unique.
Regardless of the way a court measures endorsement, the bringing of
an Establishment Clause case probably means that some real person
thinks the state has endorsed religion.
Professor Feigenson has proposed a version of the "real person"
test which borrows concepts from defamation and equal protection
law.56 The analogy to defamation law comes in the first step of the
process of determining whether there has been a constitutional viola-
tion: a plaintiff's perception that the government has endorsed reli-
gion, along with a cogent supporting explanation, is enough to shift
the burden to the government to prove the legitimacy of its act.57 The
government act will be subjected to "intermediate scrutiny."5" The
51. See supra text accompanying note 15.
52. This is Smith's interpretation. See Smith, supra note 9, at 291-95.
53. Hirt, supra note 9, at 839 ("[A]n essential defect in evaluating symbolic union [is]
determining the number of persons competent to evaluate its existence, and from what
segments of society the 'observers' should be selected.").
54. Smith, supra note 9, at 291.
55. See Smith, supra note 9, at 291-92 (discussing the goal of preventing the creation of
insiders and outsiders).
56. See Feigenson, supra note 8, at 94-101.
57. Id.
58. For a general explanation of "intermediate scrutiny," see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1601-18 (1988).
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government must prove that its action is "strongly related to an im-
portant secular purpose, including other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution."59
Despite the clarification Professor Feigenson's analogy provides,
criticisms of using real people still apply because the test relies heavily
on the reactions of individuals who may be hyper-sensitive and/or in-
genuine. Instead of giving those who claim to perceive endorsement
the power to thwart state action, the test gives them the power to sub-
ject state action to rigorous scrutiny.
Feigenson's approach is cogent and may ultimately be workable.
Feigenson's approach, however, is simultaneously too strict and too
lenient. A great deal of state action is useful, but does not rise to the
level of an "important" governmental interest. Such actions may be
halted under Feigenson's test, even where the actions are relatively
innocuous. On the other hand, Feigensen's test permits any endorse-
ment, no matter how damaging to First Amendment values, that is
reasonably tailored to an important government interest. As will be
discussed below, the First Amendment may require more protection.60
B. Problems with Using the Objective Observer Standard
The use of a fictitious character to determine the objective mean-
ing of a government act avoids the problems associated with the "real
people" standard. Nonetheless, use of a fictitious character generates
problems. Justice O'Connor's discussion of the objective observer
standard is short on defining characteristics. As Professor Marshall
asked, "Is the objective observer... a religious person, an agnostic, a
separationist, a person sharing the predominate religious sensibility of
the community, or one holding a minority view?"'" Whatever set of
values is to be plugged into this "objective observer" black box, appli-
cation of the standard faces practical difficulties. Any choice carries
all of the problems discussed above, without the problems of deter-
mining whether the perceptions of endorsement are genuine, but with
the problems that accompany any person's attempt to think like some-
one else.
59. Feigenson, supra note 8, at 101.
60. See infra Parts IV and V.
61. Marshall, supra note 5, at 537. See also The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 103
HARV. L. REv. 137,234 (1989) ("The first problem with the endorsement test concerns the
relevant perspective from which to judge the effect of governmental acts.").
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Because the objective observer standard lacks an "empirical
touchstone,"'6 there is a danger that the standard will enable Judges
to ask whether they perceive endorsement. This risk does not assume
that judges will act in bad faith. They may try to be fair and reason-
able and follow precedent, but still be left without guidance because
the standard lacks clear, concrete principles. Words do not have an
"objective meaning" to all people. Therefore, a judge will have diffi-
culty applying the standard. More importantly, the ultimate resolu-
tion of the case will be difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate.
A standardless test allows the user to guide the test to the desired
result, rather than vice-versa.63 The use of an objective observer thus
far suggests that it is hardly a guarantee of consistent results.64 Unless
the endorsement test has a more clearly-defined procedure for sepa-
rating endorsements from non-endorsements, it is doomed to be an
amorphous "I know it when I see it"65 standard, rather than a princi-
pled test worthy of the constitution it serves. Justice O'Connor has
yet to offer a satisfying procedure.
The use of the objective observer standard is not necessary or
helpful for the endorsement test. If the objective observer's outlook is
undefined, it provides no guidance to the judge except as a reminder
to be impartial and objective. If the observer's outlook is defined, the
usefulness of working through a fictitious character, rather than sim-
ply announcing criteria for judges to apply, is unclear. Thus, the
Court should abandon the objective observer standard, and adopt a
test that does not require judges to think like nonexistent people.
C. Response to the Criticism
There are two potential responses to these legitimate criticisms of
O'Connor's endorsement test. One is to abandon the test altogether.
The other is to refine the test while minimizing its problems. This
Article takes the latter approach because the test has substantial ad-
vantages over other tests. Before comparing the tests, however, it is
62. Smith, supra note 9, at 292-93; Feigenson, supra note 8, at 90 ("[T]he 'objective' or
'reasonable' observer is, in the final analysis, the judiciary."). See The Supreme Court-
Leading Cases, supra note 61, at 235. This is a particular problem given that the question
ought to be one of law, adjudicated based on consistent constitutional principles, rather
than the values of an individual or a community.
63. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 61, at 235.
64. See Feigenson, supra note 8, at 91 (noting conflicting conclusions reached by jus-
tices purporting to apply the objective observer test).
65. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). The quota-
tion was first cited in this context by William P. Marshall. See Marshall, supra note 5.
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first necessary to explore what endorsement means, and how the test
ought to be applied. Thus, the following section proposes a definition
of the endorsement test.
IV. Endorsement as "Adoptive Action"
The first step in justifying the endorsement test is to search for a
more precise understanding of what endorsement means. To endorse
is to express definite approval or acceptance. 66 Thus, any understand-
ing of endorsement should isolate state actions that publicly approve
or disapprove of religion.67 The proposal of this Article, the "adop-
tive action" standard, grows out of this understanding:
The government unconstitutionally endorses religion when it takes
adoptive religious action. An adoptive religious act is an action that
expresses approval or disapproval of religion in general, a particular
religion, or a "distinctively religious" element of a religion. If approval
or disapproval is not explicit, it should nonetheless be inferred when a
special benefit or burden has been assigned to religion in general, a
particular religion, or a distinctively religious element of a religion, un-
less it seems likely that the benefit or burden was assigned pursuant to
purely secular criteria that are not a "sham." Courts considering Estab-
lishment Clause challenges confront a wide variety of situations, and the
test should be consistent when applied to all of them.
Evaluation of endorsement involves a determination of what a
particular act communicates. All actions bear communicative poten-
tial. Sometimes an actor uses tools of communication, such as sym-
bols and language, and acts primarily with the purpose of
communicating a message to others. At other times, an actor may not
use tools of communication or intend to communicate. Even then,
any observer interprets the act.
It is not difficult to attach meaning to another's act. To make the
endorsement test legitimate, the test must offer a principled method
of interpretation that justifies choosing one meaning over another.
This Article does not purport to present an infallible method of choos-
ing the best interpretation in all situations. It simply offers interpre-
tive tools in the hope that those tools will make the interpretive
process reasonably consistent. No test, at least no constitutional test
claiming to strike a reasonable balance between important conflicting
values, can eliminate the ambiguity and judgment inherent in adjudi-
66. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 749 (1986).
67. Reference to religion throughout includes irreligion; the state may not direct its
approbation or criticism at religion or irreligion.
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cation.68 At best, a test can strike a good balance between the con-
flicting values and be administrable.
Finding an unconstitutional endorsement requires consideration
of three elements: (1) who the actor is, (2) what the subject matter of
the action is, and (3) what the relationship between the actor and the
subject matter is.
A. The Actor. Who Cannot Endorse?
The Establishment Clause restricts government actions. Conse-
quently, agents of the state who are acting in their official capacity are
the only actors within the ambit of the test. All state agents have in-
dependent potential for endorsing religion. Application of the test
does not involve a determination of an overall state message. Any
actor vested with at least some authority to act independently in the
name of the state should not use that power to establish religion.
Viewing every state actor as having independent potential for taking
unconstitutional action is consistent with the longstanding approach of
the courts. Courts do not require that legislative action be national or
statewide for it to be unconstitutional.69
Thus, every act of each state agent is an independent unit for pur-
poses of the endorsement test. Each person and institution, to the
extent that he, she or it has been vested with sufficient state power,
has the ability to use that power to violate the Constitution. Some
state agents are extremely unlikely to take any religious action in their
official capacities. A city dog-catcher, for example, is vested with state
power, but any action she takes with regard to religion would likely be
outside the scope of her granted authority.
B. The Subject-Matter of the Action: What Cannot Be Endorsed?
Since the proposed test prohibits the government from communi-
cating a "religious" position, one must have some sense of what "reli-
gion" is. A comprehensive definition of religion is beyond the scope
of this Article. Instead, the Article will use an operational definition
of religion based on shared cultural meaning.70 Given the endorse-
68. Cf. Emmet T. Flood, Note, Fact Construction and Judgment in Constitutional Adju-
dication, 100 YALE LJ. 1795 (1991) (arguing that the ability of legal rules to anticipate and
handle particular sets of facts is overestimated, and that fact construction requires skills
ignored by most jurisprudential theories).
69. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (New Jersey township);
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (school district).
70. Such an approach is, on some level, intellectually unsatisfying. It is, nonetheless,
followed for two reasons. First, providing a comprehensive definition of religion is a task
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ment test's focus on communication, it is important to evaluate what
has been communicated by an act. This depends on shared meaning
because it relates to some form of public broadcast (either by word or
deed).
Yet, "shared meaning" may seem a vague concept. One early
commentary attempting to define religion for purposes of the First
Amendment 71 provides an effective set of operational criteria upon
which this Article will rely. A judge should determine whether some-
thing is a religion based on its organization (structural elements, de-
fined roles, etc.), theology (complexity of belief system), and
attitudinal conformity (ideological homogeneity).72
It might be objected that the definition is obviously geared to-
wards groups and that unique individual belief systems should be in-
cluded in the word "religion." Yet, for purposes of an endorsement
test, non-inclusion of unique individual belief systems is acceptable.
Organizations are visible social actors, and their visibility turns them
into social icons that bear shared meaning. Almost everyone has
heard of major religions and knows at least something about them. If
a "religion" belongs to only one person, it will not have a shared reli-
gious meaning in society at large.73 The judge may wish to ask
whether a particular group "look[s] and sound[s] like groups that are
unquestionably religious." 74
The government may not endorse religion in general, a particular
religion as a whole, or a distinctively religious element of a religion.
Identifying the first two of these is relatively straightforward, because
the actor refers to them explicitly. This is not implicated unless the
state names the word "religion" or names a particular religion. Refer-
that has stymied some of the most learned commentators in the field. Second, while the
absence of such a definition is devastating in other contexts, such as free exercise cases, it is
not fatal here. The Endorsement Test examines whether the symbolic meaning of acts are
primarily communicative. The meaning that is relevant is the shared cultural meaning, not
necessarily the meaning to any one person. To that extent, the stronger the religious or
antireligious meaning of something, the greater the risk that the state's relationship to it
may be an endorsement. If there is no shared meaning, there is no danger of endorsement.
71. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056,
1083-89 (1978).
72. Id. at 1087.
73. It is also worth noting that the risk that the Establishment Clause was meant to
address, and the risk that remains a risk to Establishment Clause values, pertains to the
relationship between government and large organized religions. Without the kind of
prominence that creates shared meaning, a person or group is unlikely to have access to
political power sufficient to channel toward religious ends.
74. Note, supra note 71, at 1087.
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ence to Christianity, for example, is an undeniable reference to a
religion.
The third item, a "distinctively religious" element of a religion,
may sometimes be more difficult to identify. A "distinctively reli-
gious" element of a religion is one that has meaning primarily in a
religious framework. Examples of distinctively religious aspects of re-
ligions include beliefs, rituals, and symbols. Not all beliefs, symbols,
and rituals used by religions have distinctively religious meanings.
The fact that the eagle has symbolic religious meaning to American
Indians75 does not bar its continued use by the government of the
United States in official seals, because the religious meaning is not a
shared one. Although many symbols have primary religious meanings
independent of their contexts, some of the decisions will need to be
based on the context of the symbol.
Most cases involve beliefs, symbols, and rituals that can be clearly
identified with religion in general or a particular religion or group of
religions (prayer, bible readings, the ten commandments, creches,
etc.). Thus, in most cases it will be easy to identify whether something
is a distinctively religious element of a religion. Beliefs, symbols, and
rituals with secular and religious aspects will, of course, be more diffi-
cult to classify. In such cases, the inquiry is different for beliefs than it
is for symbols and rituals.
Beliefs are easier to classify than symbols or rituals because their
meaning is more explicit. Whether the belief implicitly or explicitly
relies on religion for its force is useful for determining the extent to
which the belief is associated with religion. State action should not be
invalidated simply because it is consistent with a particular religion; it
must also involve something associated primarily with religion.
For example, the state may outlaw abortion despite the fact that
the impermissibility of abortion is a tenet of some religions. Neither
religion in general, nor any particular religious sect, can claim exclu-
sive ownership of the prohibition against abortion in the same way
that, for example, Christianity could claim ownership of the notion
that Jesus was the Messiah. While certain religions take positions on
abortion that rely on religious beliefs, lines drawn based on religious
affiliation could not adequately separate, even roughly, those who be-
lieve that abortion should be legal and those who believe it should not
be. Many people form opinions without relying on religious precepts,
75. Britt Banks, Birds of a Feather: Cultural Conflict and the Eagle in American Soci-
ety, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 639 (1988).
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and pro-choice/pro-life lines can be drawn within religions rather than
between them.
The important distinction is between support for a belief that can
be religious (e.g., welfare programs are desirable because the bible
says so vs. welfare programs are desirable because they decrease the
crime rate) and support for a belief that must be religious (e.g., there
is a supreme ruler of the universe). When motivations for a belief are
diverse (e.g., some people support welfare programs because they be-
lieve they are carrying out divine will, and others because they believe
it will lower the crime rate), the belief cannot have a shared religious
meaning. When what is endorsed has no shared religious meaning,
there is no endorsement of religion.
For a symbol and ritual used in religious and secular realms, the
question is whether it is identified with a religion or a religious sect.
This involves a two-step inquiry. First, the source of the symbols or
ritual creates a strong presumption regarding its current identity.
Something that grew out of religion will require a substantial meta-
morphosis and universalization to become so secular that it is no
longer distinctively religious. The second step examines the extent to
which the category defined by who has adopted the belief, symbol, or
ritual is coterminous with categories defined by membership in reli-
gious groups. The categories need not match precisely, but if they are
close, particularly if there is a correlation between crossover and as-
similation, then it is distinctively religious.
This standard becomes clearer when applied to one of the more
difficult rituals to classify, the display of Christmas trees. Some would
argue that the display of Christmas trees, although it originates in the
ritual of the Christian faith, has probably evolved to the point at which
it is no longer distinctively religious.76 In many contexts, Christmas
trees enjoy a robust existence devoid of religious meaning. Families
that ignore virtually every element of Christian ritual buy Christmas
trees as a component of a celebration that revolves around family re-
union and gift exchange, not the birth of a messianic figure.
While Christmas trees may seem innocuous to those who display
them, they retain Christian symbolism. Christmas trees, as the name
suggests, have long had a strong association with Christianity. The
source, Christianity, creates a presumption that Christmas trees are
distinctively religious. Even though they were not originally part of
76. See John Smith, Is Christmas Dead?, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, December 20,
1992, at D1.
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the celebration of Christmas, 77 but adapted from Pagan rituals,78 to-
day the trees are strongly identified with Christianity. Non-Christian
Americans who display Christmas trees took the practice from Ameri-
can Christians.
79
The second prong considers whether lines can be drawn defining
who uses Christmas trees that correspond with religious groups. Peo-
ple who display Christmas trees are overwhelmingly Christian, even
though the extent to which they practice other aspects of Christianity
(e.g. going to church) varies considerably. It is true that some non-
Christians display Christmas trees. Yet, for the most part, those peo-
ple who do not identify themselves as Christians and have Christmas
trees belong to no religion8" or have rejected most of their own reli-
gious traditions. For example, an observant Christian is far more
likely to celebrate Christmas than an observant Jew or Muslim.
Thanksgiving, though it has religious origins, is a holiday whose
celebration is unrelated to religious affiliation. It is impossible to
draw religious lines that separate those who celebrate Thanksgiving
and those who do not. While certain religious groups may reject
Thanksgiving, neither the class of people who celebrate nor those who
do not is religiously homogenous.
Something may be classified as "distinctively religious" even
though the thing is not unique to one religion (but rather is common
to several or many religions), or because it is believed that the thing is
part of some "civil religion" that is more "American" than "religious,"
despite using religious icons. Commentators have tried to distinguish
"civil religion" from "sectarian religion." Civil religion, however, is
77. Susan Martin, Why All These Traditions? Exploring the Origins of Some Holiday
Customs, BUFFALO NEws, December 23, 1992, at 7 (Christmas tree began in Germany in
first half of 8th Century).
78. Simon Schama, Christmas Tree Tradition Is Rooted in Pagan Past, ST. PETERSBURG
TiMES, December 25, 1991, at 25A.
79. Pagan Christmas trees were oak trees. Mia Stainsby, Christmas: the Real Thing:
The Meaning of It All, VANCOUVER SUN, December 19, 1992, at Ell. Further, the pagan
trees were not decorated. Martin, supra note 77, at 7.
80. It may be suggested that superficial compatibility between atheism and Christmas
trees demonstrates that Christmas trees are secular symbols. Because secular American
culture has been influenced by and has adopted many aspects of Christianity (and to that
extent is already "Christian" in some measure), a fairer test is the compatibility between
beliefs, symbols, and rituals and other religions.
Because some religions reject all contact with larger society, it would be unfair to
focus only on one other religion. Yet given the diversity of religions, the fact something
has been accepted by religions other than those that shun contact with society (in addition
to those who have no religious identity at all) is a good indication that the thing is not
distinctively religious.
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necessarily sectarian because many people are excluded. Under the
civil religion reasoning, the federal government could make Christian-
ity the official religion of the United States, as long as it did not
choose one particular sect. If expressing a belief in God is not "reli-
gious" for the purposes of the Establishment Clause, then the term is
virtually meaningless.
This Article criticized Justice O'Connor for assuming that each
action has only one "objective" meaning. The approach outlined here
may seem vulnerable to the same criticism. There are three things,
however,-that should be noted. First, this Article does not assume the
existence of one "correct" meaning; rather, guided by interpretive
rules, it looks for the most common meaning, and accepts that there
may be no common meaning. If looking to interpretive rules and so-
cial meanings does not yield one common meaning to be used, the
state action is permissible.
Second, the use of interpretive rules (e.g., whether something is
"distinctively religious") distinguishes this approach from O'Connor's,
which gives no assistance to a judge striving to glean social meaning.
Third, Justice O'Connor's search for an "objective meaning" in-
volves two questions: whether something is religious, and whether it
is an endorsement. This Article relies on shared meaning only for the
first question: its goal is to define what endorsement means, and to
assume that we have a fairly good sense in all but the most difficult
cases of what "religion" is.
C. Relationship Between Actor and Subject-Matter: What Is
Endorsement?
Deciphering the relationship between actor and subject-matter
should focus on whether action the actor takes is "adoptive." Adop-
tive action is action that conveys a message with one voice to a partic-
ular audience. "Adoptive" means that it is reasonable to infer that the
state has not only allowed the message, but also adopted the message
as its position on the question.
1. Explicit Endorsement: Primarily Communicative Acts
For actions that are primarily communicative, determining
whether the state has endorsed religion requires examining the text of
the message to see whether the state indicated a preference for reli-
gion or irreligion. A straightforward example would be a presidential
declaration that a particular religion is the true religion: an agent of
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the state would be putting the power of the state behind a theological
position.
Usually, religion in public school classrooms is primarily commu-
nicative. Teachers are vested with state power to make authoritative
statements to their audiences. Teachers in state schools should not
preach religion to their students. Classroom activities such as prayer8'
and bible readings,8n and teaching that the world was divinely cre-
ated83 would be adoptions of religion. Even the Pledge of Allegiance,
because it takes a position on a religious question (most would say the
central religious question), is adoptive.'
Communication is particularly problematic when the state dis-
plays religious symbols because symbols are purely communicative
objects. When the face of the state and the face of religion begin to
merge, the state begins to establish religion. Thus, the state cannot
display a distinctly religious symbol, like a creche or the Ten Com-
mandments, in a place identified with state authority.85  The less
81. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that vocal prayer in public
schools is unconstitutional).
82. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (declaring un-
constitutional a statute requiring that public school classes begin each day with readings
from the Bible).
83. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 604 (1987) (invalidating a Louisiana stat-
ute that required any teacher who taught the theory of Evolution to teach "Creation Sci-
ence" as well).
84. The Supreme Court held that students may not be required to participate in the
Pledge. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). At least
one court has refused, however, to hold recital of the Pledge unconstitutional if students
may be silent while teachers and other students are reciting it. Sherman v. Community
Consolidated Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1992). Though the position that volun-
tary recital of the Pledge is unconstitutional is not a popular one, the Pledge has effectively
become a prayer, and voluntary prayer has been held unconstitutional, even when those
praying are silent. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985). It should also be
remembered that the religious reference in the Pledge is not coincidental. After the
Supreme Court invalidated school prayer in Engel, there were substantial "efforts to return
God to the public schools." Leo Pfeffer, The Deity in American Constitutional History, in
RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 119, 139 (James E. Wood,
Jr., ed. 1985). President Eisenhower attended a sermon in New York at which the Rever-
end lamented the secularness of public education, and of the Pledge in particular, urging
that the words "under God" be added. Id. at 140. President Eisenhower subsequently
convinced the Congress to amend the Pledge. Id.
85. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (finding unconstitutional the posting
of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 624 (1989) (prohibiting the display of a creche in a state courthouse); Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992).
But cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (finding constitutionally permissible a
creche erected by a city in a park owned by a private organization); Allegheny v. ACLU,
supra (allowing Chanukah menorah); Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 976 F.2d
1386 (11th Cir. 1992) (allowing menorah display in rotunda of state capitol because state
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closely a forum is linked with state authority, and the less preferential
access is given to religion, the less likely it is that the arrangement
poses an establishment problem.
An essential component of communication is the context in which
it takes place. Just as the words "this is a holy image" can affect the
way an image is communicated, so can the setting of the image. For
example, a religious painting in the National Gallery would not be an
endorsement of religion even though the same painting could easily
be presented in a classroom in a way that does endorse religion.
There should be a presumption that context does not nullify words or
images presented. This presumption is overcome, however, in situa-
tions where the context does not represent a government position on a
religious question.
Endorsement of religion should be prohibited regardless of how
long the particular endorsement has been tolerated. Courts have gen-
erally upheld long-standing religious state practices, even when they
represent an obvious confluence of religion and the state. William
Marshall calls such practices "cultural heritage." 6 For example, the
Court declared constitutional the national motto, "In God We
Trust," 7 religious legislative invocations,8 presidential proclamations
of holidays that include religious overtones, religious references in the
Pledge of Allegiance, and a federal statute directing the President to
proclaim a National Day of Prayer. 9
The fact that our society has long engaged in a particular practice,
however, does not prove that the practice does not endorse religion.90
Justice Holmes argued that practices dating back two hundred years
by common consent should enjoy a strong presumption of constitu-
tional legitimacy. O'Connor relied on this argument in her Wallace
concurrence. 91 Professor Loewy disagrees with this notion of ongoing
common consent: "Nobody asked blacks about segregated schools,
"intentionally opened the Rotunda to numerous varieties of speech and symbolic
expression").
86. Marshall, supra note 5, at 507.
87. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
88. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1983).
89. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676-77 (reciting a litany of government practices).
90. Nor does it imply that criticism of the practice is new. For example, James
Madison, who as a legislator voted in favor of legislative prayer, later said that he thought
the practice was probably unconstitutional. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791 n.12
(1983). President Jefferson refused to make a religious Thanksgiving proclamation on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2674 (1992) (Souter,
J., concurring).
91. 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and nobody asked nontheists about the invocation."'  Democratic
government tends to produce laws and state practices that reflect the
values of the majority; the Bill of Rights exists to protect certain inter-
ests from majority encroachment.
When state action ventures into the realm of the religious, there
is a danger of establishment, even if the state action seems innocuous
to those who hold the values of the majority. Professor Lawrence
makes a similar argument with regard to racial discrimination:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Be-
cause of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many
ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individ-
ual's race and introduce negative feelings and opinions about
nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has in-
fluenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of
us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in
which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about
race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.
In other words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.93
Longstanding endorsements may seem harmless to those used to
them, but they are endorsements, and violate the constitution just as
other endorsements do.
2. Acts That Are Not Primarily Communicative
Much that the government does, of course, is not primarily com-
municative. Again, while we cannot discern what an act will commu-
nicate, we can decide what the act is likely to communicate, and to
some extent, what the act reasonably communicates. These determi-
nations are based on the explicit content of the action and common
cultural interpretive norms. By identifying classes of state action that
communicate a position on religious questions, we will be able to
identify those actions with the greatest risk of influence.
When we examine a government policy, there is a clear govern-
ment position on one question: the desirability of the policy itself.
When the government acts, it is reasonable to infer that the govern-
ment policy is worthwhile. For example, if the government adopts a
92. Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L.
REv. 1049, 1057 (1986).
93. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 322 (1987).
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recycling program or prays, a position on recycling or praying can be
inferred.
It is possible, however, to go beyond the specific policy in the
search for government positions. Policies are adopted pursuant to cri-
teria. Some policies can be explained only by resorting to criteria that
proclaim religious positions. Those policies have a relatively high po-
tential for influence, because people observing the policy can impute
the religious criteria to the government.
In other words, is there a persuasive explanation for the state ac-
tion that does not posit an impermissible religious preference? Would
the state, for example, have allocated funds differently if it were neu-
tral as to religion? Thus, the way to glean a message from an action
that is not primarily communicative is to ask whether the state is act-
ing in accordance with publicly announced secular criteria that are not
a sham. Only when the criteria are religious is the government's sym-
bolic theological neutrality is in danger.
a. Purpose Defined
This is what is sometimes meant by the word "purpose." Unfor-
tunately, "purpose" is vague, and often more confusing than helpful.
Statutory purpose is sometimes confused with legislative motivation.
For example, a legislator's vote against military spending, based on
her religious beliefs, conveys no state religious position because there
is no religious communication. Actual legislative motivation is irrele-
vant for two reasons. What is important is the state's apparent crite-
ria, not what is in the minds of state actors. Second, the criteria are
important only insofar as they help us determine what the action rea-
sonably communicates. In many cases (e.g. "A primarily communica-
tive" acts 4), the criteria are wholly irrelevant.
b. Problems with the Purpose Prong
The problems with the Lemon test's purpose prong have been
discussed extensively elsewhere.95 Justice O'Connor's treatment of
purpose is even more problematic. Justice O'Connor's justifications
for the purpose prong fail to stand up against scrutiny, and the very
difficulty of identifying the purpose behind a communication militates
against use of the purpose prong.96
94. See supra Part IV.C.1.
95. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
96. As this Article explains later, there is one circumstance in which purpose is both
relevant and ascertainable. When a religious purpose is unavoidable, because all secular
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The explanation Justice O'Connor offered in Wallace for her in-
clusion of purpose in the endorsement test is insufficient. She asserted
that the Establishment Clause "preclude[s] government from convey-
ing or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular
religious belief is favored or preferred." 9 Yet her justification went
only to conveyance, not to attempted conveyance: "When the power,
prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a par-
ticular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain." 98 If, on the other hand, the government attempts unsuccess-
fully to throw its weight behind a particular religious belief, (i.e., it
fails to communicate its support for the belief), then the coercive pres-
sure on religious minorities is harder to see.
Justice O'Connor's other justification for the prong was that the
secular purpose requirement "reminds government that when it acts it
should do so without endorsing a particular religious belief or practice
that all citizens do not share."99 Positive incidental benefits flow from
the invalidation of state action on constitutional grounds because the
decision reminds the state not to act that way in the future. Yet the
need to remind legislatures to act constitutionally does not itself make
laws unconstitutional; there must be something about a law that of-
fends constitutional principles. A court would not, for example, inval-
idate laws that do not impede free speech simply because a judge has
found evidence that key legislators intended to impede free speech.
O'Connor, however, failed to identify the harm done when the
government communicates a religious position. The problem is not
simply that the use of purpose as an automatic element of the en-
dorsement test lacks justification, but that it undermines the test by
making its application more difficult and subjective in contexts where
purpose is unclear. The difficulty of discerning what someone or
something intended to do," m as Lemon requires, is nothing as com-
pared to the difficulty of determining the communication intended.
The former speculates about subjective factors-intentions-in light
of results and potential results that can be described objectively. For
example, when a woman paints a picket fence white, it is unreasonable
explanations are implausible, then that is relevant to the Establishment Clause inquiry.
Yet because divining a purpose is usually a fruitless task, it should not be an inherent part
of every Establishment Clause analysis.
97. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70.
98. Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
99. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75-76.
100. See supra text accompanying note 91.
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to infer that she is doing so in the hope that it will make her pencil
sharp: there is an immense array of irrational purposes that can be
ruled out immediately.
Such is not the case with intent to communicate because what one
intends to communicate may bear a rational relationship to the
message any given observer perceives. Misunderstandings occur
often, and interpretation frequently neglects intended messages and
finds unintended ones. Here, it is important to distinguish the reliabil-
ity of observed phenomena and the meaning attached to the phenom-
ena. We cannot, as we did above, begin our query with the phrase
"given what we know occurred," but rather must begin "given the
meaning we have tentatively attached to what we know occurred."
An act will have an outcome most can agree occurred. Once that
outcome is established, possible purposes can be accepted or rejected
based on whether the means chosen are rationally related to them.
That is, the analysis can utilize known causal relationships. A judge
questioning what someone intended to communicate has no such rela-
tionships upon which to rely. The effects of an act are almost always
related in some way to the purpose because people do not act
randomly.
Human communication is not subject to any law of nature and is
far more difficult to wield with precision. It is common for someone
to mean one thing by a statement, but for the listener to receive a
different message, or for several listeners to take away several differ-
ent messages. Not only are the listeners' interpretations likely to be
different, they may also remember the original spoken words differ-
ently. Acts have measurable effects independent of interpretation and
words have no precise meaning independent of context and
interpretation. 1' 1
Finally, this analysis assumes that an act carries with it some in-
tention to communicate. The government, however, may act without
intending to communicate anything at all."0 2 For example, a decision
to repair a pothole in a street is probably more a function of a desire
to promote safety than of a desire to "send a message" to anyone.
Searching for an intended message, like searching for an intended re-
sult, assumes that the government is a unitary rational actor. Even
under the most simple model of legislative behavior, however, many
101. See Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the
Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases,
4 CgrT. INQUIRY 625 (Summer 1978).
102. See Smith, supra note 9, at 286.
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people make independent judgements about what best serves the in-
terests of the sovereign.
A number of political scientists have vociferously disputed the
idea that government makes decisions based on rational examination
of goals, options, costs and benefits. They have noted that govern-
mental decisions are often the product of organizational processes and
bureaucratic politics.10 3 When one thinks of government as a huge
network of bureaucrats following standard operating procedures-as
it increasingly is in the modern administrative state-it becomes far
more difficult to argue that a government action is the result of a de-
sire on the part of "the government" to communicate something.
c. The Relevance of the Purpose Prong
Purpose, however, is not completely irrelevant. There is a differ-
ence between explaining how evidence of purpose, if available, fits
into a test, and requiring that a court find "the purpose" of state ac-
tion in every case, no matter how difficult it might be. Furthermore,
there is a difference between asking "whether the purpose of an act is
to endorse religion," asking whether the purpose of a state action is
apparent, and whether the apparentness and religiousness of that pur-
pose communicates a religious position. Most purposes have nothing
to do with communication, but the fact that a law was obviously
designed with religious goals in mind may send a religious message.
If, for example, the state gives one million dollars to a religious group
to buy prayer books, the test should not be whether the line in the
budget "intended to endorse religion." It may be, for example, that
the sponsor intended to aid a bible-manufacturer in her district, and
that most other legislators who endorsed the measure had no relevant
intent. It should be enough that the state cannot point to secular cri-
teria that rationally led to this policy.
For both primarily communicative and not primarily communica-
tive action, the line between what reasonably communicates state po-
sitions on religious questions and what does not is an important one.
Actions that "reasonably communicate" bear the greatest risk of influ-
ence. For other actions, this should be obvious: explicitly religious
messages that are more likely to religiously influence than other
messages. For primarily uncommunicative actions, if we can reason-
ably infer a religious position, so will many other people.
103. Both of these theories are discussed and contrasted with the "rational actor"
model in GRAHAM T. ALLISON, TIE ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971).
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d. Determining Whether Primarily Uncommunicative Action is
Adoptive
As noted earlier, the key to determining whether an act that is
not primarily communicative is adoptive is whether it is taken pursu-
ant to secular criteria. This section will discuss how that test should be
applied.
Given that the primary burden on the state is to use secular crite-
ria when making decisions, religion may at times receive benefits not
available to all. Under some definitions of "endorsement," placing
religious activities within a limited group of permitted activities consti-
tutes "endorsing" the religious activities as worthwhile. Such an un-
derstanding, however, is unworkable. In the United States, most
religious activities fall in the preferred classification "legal activities."
For example, while the government may "prefer" prayer to criminal
activity, any endorsement test that invalidated a zoning ordinance be-
cause it allowed houses of worship but not brothels would do unac-
ceptable damage to the Free Exercise Clause, because no religion
would be permitted,"° effectively establishing irreligion.1°5
Moreover, just as government cannot assign a benefit to religion
simply for being religion, neither can it single out religion for punish-
ment because it is religion. This is not to say that there is never a risk
of endorsement in this category of cases; it is merely to say that such
actions are not per se unconstitutional. Only if the state confers an
advantage on religion for being religious does the state wander into
the realm of adoptive action.
Of course, a religious preference is impermissible when treated as
either an intrinsic or instrumental good. Thus, a statute should not
stand if it allocates money to a religious group on the basis that
spreading the gospel improves the well-being of the community, even
though community well-being is a secular criterion. 06 Religion can-
104. Or, the state would be forced to allow brothels and even more undesirable
institutions.
105. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) ("The Establishment Clause does
not license government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue
of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique
disabilities."). For an argument that this has already happened, see N.J. DEmERAH III &
PHILIP E. HAMMOND, RELIGION IN SOCIAL CoNTEx. TRADITION AND TRANSTON 168-
73 (1969). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CH. L.
REv. 195 (1992).
106. Professor Choper reaches similar results by arguing "if the primary effect is to
serve a religious end, the action's purpose should not be characterized as secular even
though an ultimate or derivative public benefit may be produced." Choper, supra note 39
at 278. See also Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed Constitu-
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not be an "engine of civil policy"'10 7 because it cannot become one
without the state passing judgment not only on the religion's ability to
compete in purely secular realms (e.g., deciding that Christian Broth-
ers can produce a better wine value than their competition, or that a
Jewish group has made the highest bid to purchase government
land'08 ), but also on the religious aspects of the religion (e.g., Catholic
beliefs improve people).
The state can convey its resources to religion so long as religion is
not given preferential access. Although the state actively supports
religion in this way, such actions are not adoptive because the state
simply allows religion to compete for state resources as anyone else
would, without penalty or advantage. 0 9 The state can allocate re-
sources without passing judgment on the value of a group's activities,
beyond a level necessary to ensure that the activities are legal, if the
resources are allocated consistent with the assumptions discussed in
this article. The easiest cases involve resources available to all, includ-
ing religious groups. The state may, for example, provide fire and po-
lice services to religion.1 0
The state may also distribute scarce resources to religious groups
when the above criteria are met. A common example is allocating the
use of a state-owned space as a forum for religious activities. The
state may provide a forum for a religious activity, so long as it is clear
from the context that the religious character of the activity did not win
it preferential access. For example, a school may permit religious
tional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 335 (1962-63). Yet since he rejects second-guessing
legislative motives, and does not require that the state utilize the most effective (or the
most secular) method of achieving its secular goals, he leaves the state too much freedom
to characterize the religious and secular benefits in ways that do not make the secular
purpose derivative. For example, if one characterizes the secular purpose of classroom
prayer as "to prepare children for their work, to quiet them from the outside," id. at 369,
the secular benefits are derivative. On the other hand, if the secular benefit is "keeping
children off of the streets," then the secular benefit is realized regardless of whether the
religious one is achieved. Further, if the secular benefit of an activity is not derivative,
religion may then be "mixed in" without risk of unconstitutionality. If the Pledge of Alle-
giance does not rely on its religious reference to promote patriotism, see id at 348-49, then
any religion the Pledge contains must be unobjectionable.
107. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS, para. 5, quoted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947).
108. See Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York, 928 F.2d 1336,1348 (2nd Cir. 1991).
109. Cf Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1 (1992)
(arguing that equality increasingly drives Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and search-
ing for the appropriate conception of equality for the jurisprudence to use).
110. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
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groups to meet if they allow other groups to meet as well, and the
school sends no message that any particular activity is preferred."'
In most cases, if a forum is widely available, the fact that religion
is using it at a given time does not mean the state has taken a position
on the message of the group. Even if a forum is not as widely avail-
able, the allocation is legitimate so long as the criteria for selection are
apparent and purely secular (e.g., religious paintings are displayed in
the National Gallery because their artistic value is on a par with other
paintings there). For example, if the state wishes to restore buildings
based solely on historical and aesthetic considerations, it may consider
religious buildings in the program."
2
The reason it matters whether secular criteria are "apparent" is
that although imputing meaning is in some ways subjective, to the ex-
tent that we can identify common interpretive patterns, we can more
precisely define what the action reasonably communicates. When gov-
ernment action carries an obvious, persuasive secular explanation, we
can define as objectively unreasonable any claim that the action com-
municates a state religious position. There are other relevant factors
as well. Because one makes a conscious choice to support a particular
position, the degree of government control is an essential factor in
determining whether the state endorses a message by providing the
forum. Another factor is the degree to which those who are not part
of the religion receiving the benefit can avoid the state action.
The forcefulness of any communication is largely a function of
coercion 1 3 that attends the communication. Effective communication
111. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). One troubling aspect of
Mergens is that School Board Policy 5610 recognized student clubs as a "vital part of the
total education program as a means of developing citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good
human relations, knowledge and skills." Id. at 231. There are two ways to understand this.
One is that the policy set forth criteria for selecting organizations that could meet at
school. This would raise concerns about school endorsement of religion. The other is that
the policy endorsed the idea of students meeting in groups as compared to totally unstruc-
tured time.
In light of the Equal Access Act's command of content-neutrality, the second reading
is preferable. But cf Michael L. Commons & Joseph A. Rodriguez, "Equal Access" with-
out "Establishing" Religion: The Necessity for Assessing Social Perspective-Taking Skills
and Institutional Atmosphere, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 323, 334 (1990) (presenting em-
pirical data that casts doubt on the ability of secondary school administrators to treat all
student groups equally).
Although it is probably true that the school was not indifferent to the subject matter of
the groups, e.g., it would not allow a group whose purpose was to take drugs, limiting clubs
to lawful activities does not mean endorsing the ideology of any particular club.
112. See Frohliger v. Richardson, 218 P. 497 (Cal. 1923).
113. Coercion and other similar factors are not wholly irrelevant to the Establishment
Clause but should not constitute the content of the test alone.
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requires not only a speaker but also an audience. A state action that
people cannot avoid observing or being a part of carries the strongest
presumption of religious communication. Classroom lessons fall into
this category. Not far behind are those state actions that can be
avoided, but whose avoidance requires special effort and carries a sig-
nificant cost (e.g., asking to be excused in front of one's peers). Activ-
ities that require special effort for participation should be
presumptively valid. Thus, a graduation speaker who invokes divine
blessing" 4 is a far greater constitutional problem than a pre-gradua-
tion prayer session held in another part of the school.
Lack of state control over the ultimate allocation of benefits can
help a program survive constitutional challenge. For example, if the
state gives students vouchers to use at the school of their choice," 5 the
state would not take a position as to which kinds of education are
desirable and which are undesirable, beyond requiring accreditation
(i.e., secular criteria applied equally). A similar result is obtained if
state-paid sign language interpreters accompany deaf students to pa-
rochial schools." 6
And even though a limited number of people are on a govern-
ment payroll, the fact that some employees give a portion of their sal-
aries to religion is irrelevant. First, all people, religious and
nonreligious, are eligible for government jobs. Second, religious do-
nations are beyond the control of the government." 7 An endorse-
ment must appear to be a conscious choice. It is not an endorsement
if individuals, not the government, make the ultimate decisions that
benefit religion.
For similar reasons, there is an important difference between the
state doing something on its own initiative, and as a concession to de-
mands of a bargaining adversary. This is consistent with the Supreme
Court's view of state action.
Although it is impossible to articulate a precise rule for finding
shams (a sham is, after all, a concerted effort to bypass the goals of a
114. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (invalidating the practice of inviting
clergy to deliver middle school graduation invocations).
115. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (allowing a blind
person to use a state vocational grant for training to become a religious professional).
116. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2642 (1993).
117. True, the government could require employees to pledge not to donate money to
religion. This, however, would be an unconstitutional infringement on free exercise. Nor
does the knowledge that employees will donate money to religion constitute sufficient gov-
ernmental affirmative action to aid religion for it to be an endorsement.
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rule while conforming to the letter of the rule), certain factors provide
guidance.
The size of the limited class is the most important consideration.
If the class is limited, and religious groups are the only ones with cer-
tain characteristics that are omitted from the class, then their exclusion
discriminates against religion and endorses irreligion. Just as a large
class containing only a few religious groups is likely to be permissible,
a very small class that consists exclusively or almost exclusively of reli-
gious groups," 8 or a class not dominated by religious groups in which
religious groups receive the lion's share of benefits,11 9 is highly suspi-
cious. The state would need to make a stronger demonstration that its
actions were based on secular criteria, relevant to a significant state
interest. The need for legislative freedom requires substantial defer-
ence, allowing some "shams" to slip through the cracks. The state,
however, must make at least a plausible case that there is a state inter-
est that it is seeking to further.
Thus, the state can create a tax exemption for all "charitable,"
"nonprofit," or a similar class of institutions, so long as the criteria are
facially secular and have a rational basis, the class is not religiously
dominated, and the benefit is distributed fairly to everyone who quali-
fies under the criteria.
The state has an even stronger case for eligibility of religious enti-
ties if it receives a material benefit in return. For example, if the gov-
ernment "purchases" something tangible, and the seller offered the
"best deal," it is unreasonable to infer that the government agreed
with the seller on a theological level. This analysis, however, applies
only to acts that are not primarily communicative. When acts are pri-
marily communicative, the separate analysis described above1
2 0
should be followed.
One particularly thorny category of selectively conferred benefits
is "non-interference." Non-interference consists of religious exemp-
tions from laws and regulations of general applicability. Given what
has been said so far, non-interference would seem to be adoptive. It is
certainly conceivable that a theory of the Free Exercise Clause could
demonstrate that the clause requires an exception to an Establishment
Clause theory that in principle does not allow for some religious ac-
118. See Comm. Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state income tax benefits
to parents of children in private schools, virtually all of which were secular).
119. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax credit for all parents, but parents
paying tuition were primary beneficiaries).
120. See supra Part IV.C.1.
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commodation. Furnishing such a theory, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article. It should be remembered, however, that the
state can grant exceptions to classes whose boundaries are not drawn
along religious lines; for example, exempting all those with good faith
conscientious objection to a particular law.
V. The Individual, Religion, and the State
Before considering what test best serves the Establishment
Clause, it is useful to examine religion as an individual phenomenon,
and the effect of government participation in that phenomenon. This
groundwork should provide standards for comparing the possible
tests.
A. Religion and Individual Choice
Religion is an intensely personal phenomenon. Certainly, there
are group religious activities; nonetheless, every human is ultimately
alone when it comes to religious decisions. Many children have reli-
gion (or atheism, for that matter) thrust upon them by parents. Yet
once they reach adulthood, and to some extent earlier, individuals de-
termine for themselves what organized religions (if any) they will par-
ticipate in, what doctrinal precepts and rituals they will accept, and
what original religious beliefs or behavior they will adopt. Their
choices may be similar to those of other people, but no one, govern-
ment or other individuals, can make their choices for them.
This is inevitable. No matter how extensive our regulatory state
becomes, all the government can do is create incentives for acting one
way or another, or influence beliefs through its communication. Even
if the government criminalized belonging to a particular religion, this
would deter many people but would not take away their free choice.
Government can influence choices at the level of belief and behavior,
but it cannot take the choices away from the individual.
B. Government Influence on Individual Religious Decisions
Government actions influence individual behavior, sometimes in
ways that are intended and sometimes in ways that are unanticipated.
Government religious policy is no exception to this rule. One of the
primary goals of this Article is to articulate a framework for evaluat-
ing which religious influences should be permitted and which should
not be. Such an evaluation should look to two subordinate questions.
First, how desirable or undesirable is the particular influence? Sec-
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ond, what are the other characteristics of the government action that
causes influence?
It is a truism that our government is not one of unlimited powers,
that there are certain areas assigned to its judgment, and certain areas
that are not. Government religious influence on individual religious
decisions is per se undesirable. Given that religious influence (or the
risk of it) often attends important government functions, however, the
undesirability of influence may not be enough for courts to invalidate
government action.
Government religious influence is wrong because religion is not
an area that the Constitution assigns to the government's discretion.
The Establishment Clause, which prohibits any action "respecting an
establishment of religion,"'' is an emphatic rejection of the notion
that the government may select an official religion under any conceiv-
able set of criteria. The ban on laws "prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]"' 12 is a warning to the government not to pass judgment on
individual religious practices.
While the courts have allowed government to interfere with rei-
gious behavior that impedes the pursuit of important secular state
goals, 123 government may not single out religious practices for perse-
cution because it disagrees with their theological legitimacy. This con-
ception of the religion clauses, as mandating that government should
not pick a religion for its citizens, squares with the other provisions of
the First Amendment. As Justice Jackson stated, "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion or other matters of opinion."' 24
This conception of the First Amendment is also supported by
broader theories that explain the structure the Constitution erects, the
functions it permits and denies government. When the majority,
through the apparatus of democratic government, is given the author-
ity to make policies applicable to all, it is almost invariably because
government has advantages over individual action that are needed or
useful.
First, government overcomes collective action problems that pre-
vent individuals acting independently from accomplishing what is in
121. U.S. CoNsT., amend. I.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Free Exercise Clause
does not provide religious exemption to anti-peyote laws).
124. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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the collective interest. A classic example is public works construction,
such as a bridge. Although everyone in an area may agree a bridge is
needed, without government there would be "free rider" problems:
individuals would value the bridge but not contribute, assuming that it
would be built anyway because other people want it. If government
levies taxes and constructs the bridge, it can ensure that all contribute.
Second, government has superior and relatively impartial infor-
mation-gathering capabilities. It has the resources to analyze the costs
and benefits of various plans comprehensively. Therefore, if no pri-
vate company is big enough to oversee construction of all aspects of
the bridge, the government can do it.
Third, the government can implement community values on ques-
tions for which there are no objectively "right" and "wrong" answers,
but are appropriate for community disposition. If the bridge can ter-
minate either at a hospital or at an airport, the community should be
able to weigh the tradeoffs and decide what it values most on this
question affecting the entire community.
The Constitution assigns religious decisions to the individual be-
cause none of these advantages of government is particularly impor-
tant in the religious sphere. Collective action problems are not a
concern: to the extent that individuals wish to act in groups, they can.
But no one should be forced to participate in religious activities. Vol-
untarism is the essence of collective religious action. Religion does
not revolve around projects that people would contribute to only if
others did because religion is primarily an individual process. It does
not leave most people longing for a draconian coercive apparatus to
compel others to act in a particular way; to the extent that people do
wish that, their wish is constitutionally impermissible.
Nor are government's information-gathering capabilities particu-
larly useful on religious questions. Religion often claims to offer
truth. Yet there is no way to determine whether government religious
influence represents truth, because there are no objective standards
for evaluating the value of particular religions or religion in general,
as there are for methods of building bridges. As individuals,'we can
believe that one religion is better than another, or that there is no
supreme being, or that there is life after death. But we cannot prove
any of these notions to someone who does not accept certain starting
assumptions on faith. Only the individual can decide, after consider-
ing his own most fundamental values and beliefs, what his religious
views are.
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It is for similar reasons that the government's third advantage is
also irrelevant, and is in fact inimical to the nature of religion: the
Constitution does not throw religious questions to majority decision-
making because the individual nature of religion makes community
values less important than individual values. In fact, while the give-
and-take that is characteristic of political negotiation may be accepta-
ble in the case of a bridge, it tends to debase religion."z
C. Consequences of Government Influence
There are at least three potential consequences of government
religious influence. First, it can affect individual religious choices.
Second, it can cause psychological damage to non-adherents. Third, it
can deter individuals from participating in the social and political
spheres and encourage religious discrimination and persecution in
those spheres.
1. Altering Religious Choices
The most important consequence of government influence is that
it may alter "pure" religious choices. That is, individuals' religious
125. Some commentators have argued that state religious intervention is desirable.
Michael Maddigan, for example, has suggested that use of "civil religion" by government is
beneficial to society. See Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion,
and the Public Church, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1993). Maddigan would allow civil religion
on the basis that the state and the market are crowding out voluntary associations (some of
which are religious), and the voluntary associations perform useful roles in society. There
are four problems with his analysis. First, it is not clear that government and the market
pose meaningful dangers to voluntary associations. Second, even if they do, public ac-
knowledgment of religion probably will not save them.
In fact, government involvement may even harm religion. Many people concluded
that this actually happened during the 1992 presidential campaign, when some politicians
frequently invoked God while campaigning. See Using God as a Cudgel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
1, 1992, at A16 (National Council of Churches decried practice as "blasphemous"); Wil-
liam Safire, God Bless Us, N.Y. TImEs, Aug. 27, 1992 at A23 ("[T]he name of the Lord is
being used as a symbol for the other side's immorality, much as the American flag was
used in previous campaigns as a symbol for the other side's lack of patriotism.").
Second, though he points to benefits of religion, Maddigan does not show that reli-
gious voluntary associations are better than secular ones at inculcating important values.
Why, for example, does going to church more effectively promote community values than
attending a neighborhood group that meets weekly to discuss issues of community
importance?
Third, pinning our hopes on religion to remedy the shortcomings of state and market
is arguably unwise, especially given that many people feel alienated by traditional religion.
Secular voluntary associations, in contrast, are accessible to everyone.
Fourth, given the values at stake in the Establishment Clause, it is probably not safe to
allow the community to homogenize individual values in order for the community to func-
tion more effectively.
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choices may be different from what they would have been without any
government influence. 26 This is particularly true of children in pre-
college educational settings. 27 Even adults are sensitive to influence,
especially given the authority of the government, and the inability of
individuals to empirically verify that they themselves, and not the gov-
ernment, are right. When people believe that government is lending
its authority to a religious position, the religious position may become
more appealing than it would otherwise have been.
It would be a gross exaggeration to claim that all people instantly
emulate whatever the government does. Nevertheless, many people
look to leaders not only to address specific national problems but also
to provide moral, ethical, religious, and other kinds of personal
leadership.
The challenge is even greater for members of minority religions,
for whom communication of a government position only compounds
the knowledge that their position is one rejected by the majority.
Once again, if we could be sure that the majority is more likely to be
"right" about religion than the minority, this would be less of a prob-
lem, but we cannot.
Because we value religious autonomy, we make no effort to stop
majority religions from broadcasting their existence or beliefs to
others, no matter the discomfort or influence this may cause members
of minority religions. The government, however, has no First Amend-
ment right to practice religion.
It is individuals who are the best judges of their own religious
needs. Religion is a process so fundamental to self-definition that
choices about religion are essentially choices about identity. There-
fore, because government is less qualified than the individual is this
area, to the extent that it influences individual choices, it is influencing
them in the "wrong" direction.
126. Admittedly, the notion of "pure" choices is somewhat artificial, given that in many
ways we are the products of all influences upon us, and have no distinct identities separate
from our experiences. The construct of pure choice, is useful, nonetheless, to the extent
that it compares how we would be with and without government influence.
127. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,584 (1987) ("[S]tudents [in elementary and
secondary schools] are impressionable .... The State exerts great authority and coercive
power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students' emula-
tion of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure."); Eliza-
beth W. Ozorak, Sociological & Cognitive Influences on the Development of Religious
Behaviors & Commitment in Adolescence, 28 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 448
(1990) (providing data on the impressionability of teenagers).
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Government's religious influence can have real consequences. 28
It might, for example, accelerate the assimilation of members of mi-
nority religions, 29 or encourage insincere religiosity. 30 Many people
respond on some level to signals they receive from their political or
social culture. When these cultures encourage some religious behav-
ior and discourage others, many people can ignore the encouragement
effectively, but others will adapt to their environment.
2. Psychological Harm
In addition to the risk of altering "pure" individual decisions, this
kind of communication also risks imposing psychological costs on non-
adherents. Religious beliefs go to the core of a person's identity, and
the state should not launch a psychological assault on those whose
beliefs or self-identification differ from those of the majority.' 3' This
assault can be particularly potent when individual government actions
combine to erect a "unified national identity" with regard to religion
that intrudes upon distinct individual religious identity.
32
Further, one's religion is not a discrete, severable component of
one's self. For many people, religious beliefs form the underpinnings
of legitimacy: I believe that I am a good person because I am doing
what my religious beliefs tell me to do. As a result, when those beliefs
are thrown into question, identity, relationships, and past actions all
become suspect. Identities validated by government action ("the in-
group") may perceive no significant phenomenon, but others ("the
out-group") may feel personally attacked, and lose self-esteem. If this
causes no change in behavior, just a decrease in self-esteem, this is
128. Cf Feigenson, supra note 8, at 63 ("By making religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community, government threatens to coerce or compromise that
person's religious beliefs.").
129. Cf. Timothy Bakken, Religious Conversion and Social Evolution Clarified: Simi-
larities Between Traditional and Alternative Groups, 17 SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR 157
(1987) (arguing that conversion is caused by psychological pressures, not rational selection
from a marketplace of ideas); John M. Hartenstein, A Christmas Issue: Christian Holiday
Celebration in the Public Elementary Schools Is an Establishment of Religion, 80 CAL. L.
REV. 981, 989-1001 (1992) (contending that symbols and rituals transmit group religious
identity).
130. See James Hitchcock, Church, State and Moral Values: The Limits of American
Pluralism, 44 LAw & ComnrMv. PROBs. 3 (1981).
131. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82
Nw. U. L. REv. 1113, 1164-66, 1172-76 (1988) (discussing the harmful effects of state chal-
lenges to individual religious beliefs).
132. Janet L. Dolgin, Religious Symbols and the Establishment of a National 'Religion',
39 MERCER L. REV. 495, 512 (1988) ("A unified national identity replaces individual and
group identities.., collective interests become identical with the interests of the state.").
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substantial harm. Yet the influence can have social consequences as
well.
3. Social Harms
The consequences of social harms from state endorsement of reli-
gion go beyond the religious sphere: the government may be commu-
nicating a divisive message that draws lines based on religion but
whose implications are social and political. This can have profound
consequences, given that so much social interaction is based on
perceptions.
In justifying her test, Justice O'Connor highlights one of the more
immediate consequences of this contention that the government's pen
can be as mighty as its sword. Endorsement, she argues, "sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders.., and an accompa-
nying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community.'
133
Some commentators have reacted to this argument with skepti-
cism. Steven Smith, for example, contends that relatively undramatic
symbolic communication, such as legislative invocations and the theis-
tic motto on coins "do not appear to alter anyone's actual political
standing in any realistic sense; no one loses the right to vote, the free-
dom to speak, or any other state or federal right if he or she does not
happen to share the religious idea that such practices appear to
approve."'1
34
By focusing entirely on the least significant communication,
Smith unfairly downplays the effects of the class. What is more, even
relatively innocuous communication that is explicitly religious has un-
desirable effects. Smith caricatures O'Connor's argument, assuming
that her claim is that the proximate effect of religious communication
is a palpable change in political status.
The consequences, however, are more attenuated and less imme-
diately discernable. Obviously, government communication of a reli-
gious message does not instantly alter political rights. Rather, it
creates perceptions that there are insiders and outsiders, and such per-
ceptions have real consequences. The perceptions are reasonable: by
133. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Interestingly, Steven Smith, a
critic of the endorsement test, cites historical support for this goal. Smith, supra note 9, at
305-06 n.158.
134. Smith, supra note 9, at 307. But see MADALYN M. O'HAIR, FREEDOM UNDER
SIEGE: THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED RELIGION ON YOUR LIBERTY AND YOUR POCKET-
BOOK (1974) (documenting the power of organized religion in America).
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definition, a communicative alignment with one particular religious
position suggests actual alignment. When government aligns itself
with one group, those who are not members of the group become out-
siders. Although status is determined in part by the rights one can
exercise, it is largely a function of what one perceives one's status to
be and what others perceive one's status to be.
135
The ideals to which America aspires include the Lockean notion
of maximum expression and open discourse characterized by mutual
respect.' 36 If we lived up to this ideal, any negative influence from
religious communication would dissipate in the air of rationality. Yet,
the assumption that we live in a purely rational society assumes too
many things that are not true: it assumes that America is free of prej-
udice, that the marketplace of ideas functions perfectly, and that
speech evaluated based on its content and not the identity of the
speaker. In other words, it assumes that people do not discriminate
against each other based on religion and that government can be
treated as "just another speaker."
Prejudice remains a real element in American society. This coun-
try's history contains evidence of shameful religious persecution, 37
and religious prejudice that persists to the present. 38 Social forces,
135. Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Sym-
bols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv 503,519 (1992) ("Although the status of a
social group is defined by a host of interactions in the community's public life, the symbols
of government play a conspicuous role in that process."); M. FRANcis ABRAHAM, MODERN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 228 (1982) (George Mead pointed out that "[t]he self organizes
our knowledge of 'who we are' and what we think of ourselves in terms of our perception
of others' responses.").
136. See Holland, supra note 37, at 1631-32.
137. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1952) ("Colonial history had already
shown that, here as elsewhere, zealous sectarians entrusted with governmental power to
further their causes would sometimes torture, maim, and kill those they branded 'heretics,'
'atheists' or 'agnostics."'); Hitchcock, supra note 130, at 4 ("The earliest American settlers
affirmed the desirability of greater freedom than existed in the Old World, yet believed
with equal conviction that society had to rest on a common moral consensus. At various
times in history this consensus has been thought to exclude Quakers, Catholics, Jews, and
other religious groups."). See also Fundamental Constitution of Carolina, in CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 2d ed. 1987)
(imposing religious requirements for property ownership and making the act of speaking
irreverently at a religious assembly unconstitutional); Francis Canavan, The Pluralist
Game, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 27 (1981) (arguing that the majority's decision to
force Mormons to abandon polygamy was an act of religious tyranny). In the 1950s, bill-
boards urged readers to "Attend Church this week." Hitchcock, supra note 130, at 3.
138. See One in Five Americans Hold Antisemitic Views, Study Says, THE REUTERS LI-
BRARY, November 16, 1992 (Available on LEXIS in NEXIS database); Increase in An-
tisemitic Incidents Reported in the U.S., Canada, THE JERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 11, 1992
(citing a study that documented 1,879 antisemitic incidents in the United States, the highest
number in the thirteen years the study had been done); Patricia Stundza, Bias Still Rules,
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independent of government, impose significant a burdens on those
who are not part of the religious majority. Government religious par-
tisanship, even when well-intentioned, can fan the flames of intoler-
ance and bigotry by adding a voice of support for the notion that
religious out-group status is a mark of inferiority.
Although it is unlikely that government religious messages will
have immediately measurable impacts on political rights, it may en-
courage grassroots debasement of those rights. For example, though
government does not take away a person's ability to speak by verbally
siding with a religion the speaker does not belong to, the government
may ultimately impair the speaker's exercise of this fundamental right.
Similarly, while a government religious communication is un-
likely to remove anyone's freedom to run for political office in a legal
sense, it may undermine the right in a practical sense. If outsiders
come to believe that it is politically impossible for them to be elected
to the office, they may simply choose not to run. To the extent that
the government encourages already-existing attitudinal barriers to
political participation by religious minorities, such as the continuing
unwillingness of significant percentages of the population to elect a
Jewish president, 13 9 it is pushing our society backward. The framers of
the Constitution were aware of the degree to which religion could stir
irrational passions.' 40 Furthermore, we should be particularly careful
not to underestimate the extent to which a government religious com-
munication will affect people whose beliefs are implicitly or explicitly
rejected.
This has implications for the speaker who is denied one of his or
her most fundamental political rights. It also has implications for the
discourse in which he or she is participating. As one commentator
noted, "religious principles tend to comprise a total world view for
their adherents."' ' 4' Consequently, when "government promotes reli-
gious beliefs, it will be understood to favor the policy views that the
Study Says; Blacks, Women, and Jews Behind in Business, AMERICAN BANKER, Feb. 13,
1984, at 2 ("Commercial banks and insurance companies continue to have a reputation for
not being friendly to Jews.").
139. See Trial Heats: The Public Rates the Presidential Hopefuls, NATIONAL JOURNAL,
May 7, 1983, at 982 (only 79% of those surveyed would vote for a Jew for president, and
only 83% would vote for a Jew for vice-president); see also Mitchell Bard, Did My Mother
Lie to Me?, THE NEW LEADER, April 4, 1988, at 8 (Surveys probably overreport willing-
ness to elect female, Black, or Jewish presidents because "they essentially ask people to
admit to being bigoted.").
140. Hitchcock, supra note 130, at 7.
141. Feigenson, supra note 8, at 73-74.
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holders of those beliefs espouse."' 4 Usually, this means enhancing
the position of a religion vis-a-vis where it should be in a "free mar-
ket" of religious ideas.
Government communication, however, can even undermine the
position of the religion endorsed:
The history of governmentally established religion, both in Eng-
land and in this country, showed that whenever government had
allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable
result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and
even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs.143
Although the impact of religious government actions may be un-
predictable, and it may actually harm religious groups it is intended to
help, so many of the possible outcomes are undesirable that govern-
ment should not communicate any religious position.
D. Types of Government Influences
The preceding section argued it is undesirable for government to
influence individual religious decisions. Despite the risk of influence
that is present whenever government acts, however, government must
have the power to pursue legitimate ends. There are two variables
that are relevant to understanding which influences the Establishment
Clause should prohibit. The greater the risk of influence, the more
important it is to prevent the action. At the same time, the more im-
portant the action is in secular terms, the more reluctant we should be
to prevent it. We would presumably feel different about a govern-
ment function that serves no legitimate end and is extremely likely to
have significant impact on individual religious behavior than about a
central government function that bears a much smaller risk of
influence.
1. Risk of Influence
The risk of influence is a function of communication. Without
communication, there can be no influence. All government actions
bear communicative potential. Given the interpretation inherent in
communication, it is not unusual for different people to have different
interpretations of an act that are often different from anything the
actor intended. Later sections of this Article will explore what types
of things "reasonably communicate" religious meanings. For now, it is
enough to note that a statement or action that reasonably communi-
142. Id.
143. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
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cates a religious message (a conclusion we draw based on what we
know about the common meaning of the components of the statement
or action) is more likely to actually communicate a religious message
than one that does not. As a result, it is more likely to have religious
influence. We can never be certain about how people will interpret
things, but when a message has words commonly associated with reli-
gion, we can guess that it will convey religious meaning to a significant
number of listeners.
2. Legitimate Secular Functions
The previous section argued that drawing the line based on what
"reasonably communicates" a religious position protects against state
actions with the greatest risk of influence. This section will argue that
the line also gives sufficient protection to the other values at stake. In
other words, the "reasonably communicates line" goes far enough, be-
cause it identifies the greatest threats; it does not go too far, because it
leaves the government room to address social problems. This meth-
odology protects government's legitimate secular functions. Govern-
ment does not need to be able to communicate religious messages to
carry out the duties assigned to it by the Constitution. Religion, as
noted above, is not the province of the government.
Government cannot claim any need to utilize religious criteria in
choosing legislation. Government may, at times, find it useful, even in
terms of secular goals, to communicate religious messages. Yet it does
not need to, and given the harm that accompanies such messages,
should not be permitted to.
In other words, if we forbid the government from reasonably
communicating religious preferences, it can still carry out its essential
functions. We cannot forbid government from having any impact on
an individual's religious thinking, because any action carries that risk.
Of course, even central government functions inevitably raise ques-
tions involving religion. While some functions, such as building roads
or delivering mail, can be conducted without confronting religious is-
sues, others cannot. For those more difficult areas, the government
will have to be careful to avoid taking a religious position.
Distinguishing between what reasonably communicates a reli-
gious position and what does not, is not a perfect solution. Limits on
governmental actions have disadvantages. Potentially, we may lose
benefits to the extent that the First Amendment prevents the govern-
ment from doing things it perceives to be necessary.
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Two conclusions emerge from this. If the government needs to do
something in order to perform a central function, or to facilitate the
exercise of individual judgment with regard to religion, then the action
does not reasonably communicate a religious preference. The empha-
sis, once again, is on the difference between what something com-
municates and what something reasonably communicates.
"Communicates" depends on one individual's perceptions. "Reason-
ably communicates" is a term of art, defined with attention to all the
considerations this Article discusses: The need for the government to
address social problems, cultural meaning, historical context, etc.
The second point is that, although all limitations on government
action have their costs, the tradeoffs involved in increasing govern-
ment power beyond the line of "reasonable communication of a reli-
gious preference" become increasingly unattractive. There may be
benefits to a policy that communicates a state religious preference. A
group prayer at the beginning of the school day may have a calming
effect on students. Yet the costs become far more acute when the
tools are explicitly communicative and the message is explicitly reli-
gious. Although the effects are admittedly difficult to measure, they
become exponentially more likely to have an impact on the listener as
what is reasonably communicated becomes more religious.
The "reasonably communicates" line does not give the govern-
ment all the power it wants, and it does not eliminate all religious
influence. Rather, it minimizes the greatest threats to religious choice
and government power. This is not ideal, but it is the best a test can
do given the inherent tension in the Establishment Clause.
VI. A Comparison of the Tests
The line discussed above, between what is likely to communicate
and what is not, is represented by the endorsement test. "Communi-
cation of a religious government position" is religious endorsement.
Other tests do not adequately protect the values at issue in the Estab-
lishment Clause.
A. Vagueness
"Coercion"-type tests, regardless of how formulated, are inade-
quate because they are vague, and ultimately either too harsh or too
lax. Speaking in terms of "religious liberty"'" is inadequate. The
word "liberty" carries a great deal of historical baggage that ladens it
144. See Choper, supra note 39, at 267; Choper, supra note 43, at 333.
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with meanings tied to the degree of government regulation. Thus,
there is little liberty where government tells individuals what to do
and taxes heavily, and much liberty under a government that exerts
less direct control over the individual's actions. The term arose at a
time when government could accomplish what it wished by brute
force, and has only clumsy application to a society in which govern-
ment has much more sophisticated interactions with its citizens than
decrees and tax collectors.
Some commentators frame their tests in terms of "individual
choice."' 45 These commentators talk about the religion clauses as an
attempt to leave religious choices to the individual. Other commenta-
tors, in contrast, assume that there is a clear line that the government
crosses, thereby "taking away" choices from the individual. Con-
versely, these commentators argue that if the government does not
cross the line, the individual is making choices "freely," and the gov-
ernment is acting constitutionally.
This approach, for reasons we have already seen, 46 is not a useful
way of approaching the problem.'4 7 It is difficult to compare the en-
dorsement and coercion tests because the word "coercion" is so vague
that it represents many possible lines. All government actions bear
some risk of influence, and none ultimately take choices away from
individuals. Government can do religious harm without creating legal
obligations that diminish liberty. 48
Undoubtedly, we can draw clear lines that prohibit classes of in-
fluence far smaller than endorsement. Such lines would not, however,
draw sound distinctions between the influences they allow and those
they prohibit. We might, for example, bar the government from ex-
plicitly prohibiting.or requiring particular religious behavior. For ex-
ample, there is little functional difference between a civil fine and a
tax, but the latter would be permissible while the former would not.
We could prevent the government from attaching any sort of pen-
alty or reward to religious behavior. The problem with this approach
145. See id.; Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understand-
ing of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 805 (1978); Schwarz, supra
note 6.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49.
147. Cf Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REv. 701, 709 (1986);
Holland, supra note 37, at 1674 (pointing to "the Establishment Clause's notion of freedom
of conscience, which is violated whenever the government interferes with an individual's
religious freedom, not merely when the individual acts less than voluntarily").
148. This is what Professor Choper means when he speaks of "compromising" religious
liberty, though the meaning of "compromise" is left unclear.
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is that it allows the government to achieve similar results by taking
advantage of existing social processes, or creating social processes, to
do the enforcement. If, for instance, elementary school teachers led
their classes in the Lord's Prayer, but no student was formally pun-
ished for nonparticipation, it is likely that the stigma attached to being
"the only one not praying" would encourage some students to pray
even if they would not otherwise wish to. In contrast, an endorsement
test acknowledges the social reality of peer pressure, and prohibits the
government from utilizing that social pressure to achieve its own ends.
Under an endorsement test, government cannot endorse religion even
without formal penalty, thereby setting social processes in motion and
those allowing non-governmental processes to do the coercing.
B. The Need to Presume Influence
One key difference between the endorsement test and other tests
pertains to presumptions about influence. The endorsement test as-
sumes influence; other tests assume no influence unless the plaintiff
proves influence (usually "coercion"). 4 9 This section has been an at-
tempt to demonstrate that the entire class of endorsements, because
they are by definition communicative and pose the risk of influence, is
difficult to identify and prove. Given these factors, it is preferable to
presume influence. This is nothing unusual in constitutional law:
courts have often presumed violations of constitutional rights when
violations were likely but difficult to identify on a case-by-case
basis.' 5
0
149. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Choper, supra note 12, at 696-700; Holland,
supra note 37, at 1676.
150. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) (states may not adopt measures likely to deter women from having abortions,
regardless of whether the measures deter in particular cases); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v.
Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (due process requires the imposition of procedural notice re-
quirements for disposition of mortgages); Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969) (hold-
ing that a suspect's legal entitlement to remain silent without official sanction did not
satisfy his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself unless the government makes
clear to him that he has the right); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969)
(protecting against sentencing increases that violate due process requires judges to make
explicit their reasons for increasing a defendant's sentence after a second trial); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1962) (stating
that local television broadcast made juror bias likely, and thus no specific showing was
necessary).
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C. Recognition of the Cumulative Impact of Social Influences
Other tests disaggregate influence, assuming that if one action
does not demonstrably exert (or would not be likely to exert) signifi-
cant influence, then it should be disregarded and the subsequent ac-
tion challenged tabula rasa. That, however, is not the way the human
mind works. Our decisions are products of many influences that have
accumulated; one event may trigger a decision, but it does not act in a
vacuum. Perceptions of governmental action, even when each partic-
ular action is relatively minor, accumulate over a lifetime and can pro-
foundly affect an individual's value system. 5' Only the endorsement
test prevents this accumulation by focusing on the nature of the act
rather than its measurable impact.
D. Avoiding Measurement Problems
Coercion tests-unlike the endorsement test-assume that signif-
icant influence can be measured or predicted effectively. That is not a
safe assumption. First, influence must be identified before courts will
consider the issue. Humans have only a primitive understanding of
their own motivations and do not scrutinize their own motivations. In
short, the people most susceptible to government influence may not
realize or care that they have been influenced. Even if people would
come forward, such an approach puts them in the awkward position of
having to show injury, when they themselves ultimately control their
own decisions. In contrast, if the test bars endorsement, those who
challenge the law need only recognize a religious message; they need
not psychoanalyze themselves.
Second, although it is relatively easy to identify on a case-by-case
basis those actions most likely to influence individual behavior, it is far
more difficult to identify lesser but still significant risks. 5 There are
151. Cf Feigenson, supra note 8, at 81 ("Symbolic acts that seem inconsequential
might, cumulatively or over time, foster an atmosphere of public discourse in which adher-
ence to religion does make a difference."); Beschle, supra note 8, at 187.
152. The problem is not just one of deciding how probable influence will be, but also of
deciding how significant the result of the influence would be. Coercion tests generally
require the product of the influence to be fairly significant: if people are likely to be af-
fected only in relatively minor ways, coercion is acceptable.
The difficulty with taking that approach is that some of the historical underpinnings
seem far broader. The clearest example is a religious tax. The Framers of the Constitution
viewed this as one of the greatest evils to be addressed by the Establishment Clause. See
Choper, supra note 39, at 268 ("[lIt is beyond reasonable dispute that [the Establishment
Clause] purported to secure religious liberty, in particular by prohibiting taxation for reli-
gious purposes."). In Madison's view, the problem with a state religious tax was not simply
its coerciveness, but also the fact that "it is itself a signal of persecution. It degrades from
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two possibilities here. First, the tests could require speculation about
what effect the state action would tend to have, with actual effects as
relevant but not dispositive factors. The test might ask, for example,
whether the state action "tends to coerce."'15 3 Such a test, however,
would be incomplete without specifying what people are to be consid-
ered as potential victims of coercion.
An endorsement test will stumble on the same obstacle only if
tied to actual perceptions of endorsement. 4  If the question is
whether the state action would tend to coerce anyone, the court would
have to base its decision on the characteristics of the most idiosyn-
cratic and sensitive members of society. This would tie the hands of
the state.
If, on the other hand, the question asks whether a reasonable per-
son would be coerced, the test would embody majoritarian norms and
neglect the real needs of religious minorities. This, of course, would
render the Establishment Clause feckless.
Any attempt to base the test on the use of a "reasonable
nonadherent" would be hopeless. It would be a two-step process.
First, a judge would define the religious beliefs of this imaginary per-
son. Second, the judge would determine what reactions are reason-
able for a person with those beliefs. Though the second step would be
easier than the first, they both would be laden with difficulty. There is
simply no way of selecting a single set of religious beliefs with which
to imbue the "reasonable minority person." To do so would be to pass
judgment about what religious beliefs are reasonable and would there-
fore itself be an establishment of religion. 55 Social order sometimes
compels us to proscribe certain actions, but individual religious beliefs
should never be judged by the state.
the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the
Legislative authority." Lee 112 S. Ct. at 2673 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 5 THE
FoUNDERS' CONsTrrToN, 82, 83 (Phillip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner Ed., 1987).
At the same time, the impact on each individual is probably not significant. For exam-
ple, the federal government gives $50 million to a purely religious program. One hundred
fifteen million Americans filed income tax returns in 1993. Robert A. Rosenblatt, IRS
Loses Millions in Fraud With Electronic Tax Filing, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at 1. There-
fore, the program would cost taxpayers an average of less than 50 cents each.
153. Cf Choper, supra note 12 (The question is whether action is "likely to compro-
mise" religious beliefs.).
154. See supra text accompanying note 17.
155. If, as proposed here, the test becomes whether the action in question supports a
conclusion that an agent of the state in her official capacity has taken a position on a
question of religious dogma, a decision by a judge regarding the legitimacy of various reli-
gious beliefs would be a clear violation of the Establishment Clause.
ENDORSEMENT AS "ADOPTIVE ACTION"
Nor is there any method of obviating the selection of a set of
religious beliefs under this approach. Without a more specific defini-
tion, a judge cannot determine what a reasonable reaction is, for it is
not clear what "reasonable" means in this context. Reasonability can
be determined in other contexts, such as tort law,'156 by reference to
general community behavior or cost/benefit calculation. Neither is
appropriate here. The same diversity that inhibits the selection of a
set of beliefs impedes a determination of reasonability.
When the reasonableness of decision is evaluated based on its
risks and benefits, at least some of the important considerations can
be weighed. Evaluating the reasonableness of a reaction, on the other
hand, is infinitely more subjective. To ask whether a reaction is rea-
sonable is to ask one of two questions. One is whether the reaction is
reasonable for the person who is reacting. This question is not very
helpful, because the answer is almost invariably "yes."
The more common meaning of an evaluation of whether one per-
son's reaction is reasonable is a query as to whether other people
would have reacted similarly. A man is said to react unreasonably
because he is overreacting compared to how others would react to the
same situation. Perhaps if the judge selected a member of a common
religion, she could fairly say that he would react as others would.
Again, it is fine to use "reasonableness" to impose community stan-
dards in other areas, such as torts, but when it comes to religion, we
should not evaluate reasonableness by asking whether an individual
reacts like everyone else. Such an approach to a coercion test would
make protection of religious groups directly proportional to the size of
the group membership, and would leave smaller groups vulnerable to
government manipulation. If some non-Christians are unaffected
when they walk by a creche in a state building, and others who walk
by the same display feel very uncomfortable, which reaction is "cor-
rect"? A predictive approach leaves too much discretion in the hands
of a judge to make judgments about human responses to external in-
fluences. This administrative morass is a strong reason to design the
test around a conceptual category rather than an ad hoc mechanism.
Even if the measurement problems are resolved, the larger juris-
prudential problem persists. Barring only some of the government's
religious communication leaves intact a class of influence that, be-
cause it is communicative, bears a significant risk of undesirable reli-
gious influence.
156. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 32, at 173-93 (5th ed. 1984).
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E. Language and History
There is also support in the language of the First Amendment to
ban a category of action based on the relationship between govern-
ment and religion, rather than those particular actions found to have
specific effect. The Establishment Clause forbids the government
from making any law "respecting an establishment of religion." The
Establishment Clause, unlike many other clauses in the Bill of Rights,
does not explicitly create a legally enforceable right, the violation of
which gives rise to a judicial remedy. All provisions of the Bill of
Rights circumscribe government action. Most of those provisions,
however, are phrased to prohibit the government from having a par-
ticular effect on an individual; the Establishment Clause is not such a
provision. 7
As Justice Souter noted, a coercion test is difficult to square with
the text of the Constitution. He points out that the Free Exercise
Clause protects individuals against governmental religious coercion,
and consequently the coercion test would render the. Establishment
Clause "a virtual nullity.'
158
To establish is to put something into place. Establishment need
not, by definition, have any one particular effect on individuals.
Moreover, an emphasis on "religious liberty" as a "core value ' 119 is
difficult to square with the plain language of the Constitution. As one
commentator has noted, "Great Britain has shown that a formal reli-
gious establishment can become compatible with a high degree of reli-
gious liberty.'
' 60
There is some historical basis for attention to symbolism, not just
coercion. The Framers of the Constitution were concerned about
messages the government sent when it took positions on religious
questions.' 61 James Madison opposed any state attempt to promote
157. See Feigenson, supra note 8.
158. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2685 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). But cf
Steven M. Tipton, Republican and Liberal State: The Place of Religion in an Ambiguous
Polity, 39 EMORY L.J. 191, 192 (1990) ("Seen from the traditional standpoint of 'civic free-
dom' defining the Constitution's final ends, the free exercise is the controlling idea, which
non-establishment serves.").
159. See Choper, supra note 39, at 267; Holland, supra note 37, at 1638; McConnell,
supra note 43, at 941.
160. Canavan, supra note 137, at 26.
161. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2673 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Framers' special antipathy to religious coercion did not exhaust their hostility to the fea-
tures and incidents of establishment.").
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religion. He and Jefferson opposed "any political appropriation of
religion."'162
VII. Conclusion
It is not enough to say that a law may have no particular effect:
that statement raises two additional questions. The first is "on
whom?" Defining the target group too restrictively leaves vulnerable
minorities unprotected. Defining it too broadly puts legislatures at
the mercy of individuals. Although it is not uncommon for individuals
to prevent state action by invoking rights, it is unusual for them to do
so by claiming to have certain feelings. The second question is why
one effect chosen is constitutionally essential, while other seemingly
important values are neglected.
Endorsement is a preferable standard. It focuses on the relation-
ship between government and religion, rather than on the relationship
between government and the populace. Thus, endorsement avoids
having to determine whose feelings count and whose do not. The con-
cept of endorsement carries ambiguity, but such ambiguity can be re-
solved by defining "endorsement" more precisely. Both concepts,
endorsement and establishment, share a concern for the nature of the
uses of state power. Justice O'Connor's test, with further clarification
and definition, is the one that the Court ought to endorse.
162. Id. at 2673-74.
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